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stateless Contenders and the Global Mythology 
Yossi Shain 
Tel -Aviv University 
"Recognition 'has been a plaything for political 
scientists who have taken delight in posing 
abstract problems of a theoretical nature·. M' 
This essay explores the dynamics of foreign support for 
contenders who struggle over state power. It focuses. for pur-
poses of theory. on governments' employment of diplomatic 
recognition as a political mechanism to advance exiled aspirants 
to power. By examining the theory of recognition in international 
law as well as recognition practices in the political sphere -
especially vis-a-vis exiled contenders - the article seeks to 
demonstrate the slippery nature of the concept of legitimacy in 
international relations and to question the usage of the term as 
an explanatory variable in world politics . As will be evident, the 
acts of granting. withholding, or withdrawing recognition from 
governments have little to do with the philosophical approval or 
rejection of particular claims to power. although they are always 
justified in such terms. Recognition is rather one among many 
political techniques exploited by governments to further their 
selfish domestic and international agendas. The value crtteria by 
which conflicting claimants to power may be branded "legiti-
mateM or "illegitimate. M are constantly in flux. sampling from a 
large storehouse of principles which are rhetortcally acknowl-
edged by the international community as archetypes of legiti -
macy. 
In order to demonstrate the elusive nature of legitimacy 
and recognition. a wider range of historical interactions between 
sovereign governments and governments-in-exile will be dis-
cussed. They include the European approach to the deposed 
Russian government in the early 1920s; the Allied powers' 
recognition of the dislodged governments-in-exile during the 
Second World War: the short lived recognition of the Spanish 
Republicans in the immediate postwar pertod: the Organization 
of Afrtcan Unity's (OAU) recognition of anticolonial exiled libera -
tion movements. and some recent cases of recognition of govern-
ments-in -exile whose future is not yet known, including those in 
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Afghanistan and Cambodia. and the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO). 
Part one provides a broad definition of governments-in-
exile, and offers a preliminary classification of them in accor-
dance with their respective claims to power. Part two examines 
the relations between governments-in-exile and sovereign gov-
ernments while evaluating both international law theories of 
recognition and recognition practices. Part three discusses the 
shortcomings oflegitimacy as an explanatory concept in interna-
tional relations. 
I. Definition and Classification 
Governments-in-exile can be defined as opposition groups 
which struggle from outside their home territory to overthrow 
and replace the regime in their independent or claimed home 
country. These groups refer to themselves as government-in-
exile, national committees. provisional governments, national 
revolutionary councils, national liberation movements. and in 
other ways which reflect their claim to be the sole or at least the 
most viable alternative to the existing home regime. As such they 
vie for the support of their national constituencies at home and 
in the diaspora. and appeal for international assistance. There 
are other exile groups which, although similar in their ultimate 
goals and opposition strategy. do not fall under the above 
definition precisely because they do not make such total claims 
to power. These groups usually advocate a democratic change in 
their country and thus refrain from making claims to state power 
before elections have taken place. Examples of such groups 
include the Filipino exiled democratic opposition to Ferdinand 
Marcos•. the Korean exiled opposition to Chun Doo Hwana. and 
the exiled anti-Fascist opposition to Mussolini.• 
Exile contenders who make total claims to power can be 
generally classified into three major sub-groups in accordance 
with their respective goals and the grounds on which they Justify 
their quest for national and internationar support. 
The first consists of groups that strive to overthrow and 
replace their home country's native regime. They reject the 
claims made by the current home regime to represent the 
nations. but usually do not question the existence of the state or 
Its boundaries. These exile contenders present themselves either 
as a) lawfully-elected, and therefore the legitimate sovereign 
power of their nation-state: or bl traditional. and therefore the 
legitimate representatives of their national community: or c) 
most authentic. thus the legitimate spokesmen of the national 
interest (making no reference to previous governmental post-
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uons). 
The deposed Spanish Republican government -in-exile is 
a classic example of the lawfully elected type. Since the Repub-
licans' defeat in the Spanish Civil War, up until Spain's first post-
ctvil war democratic elections on July 7, 1977, oflkials of the 
exiled Republican government insisted on being acknowledged 
as the only legally mandated Spanish government. Similar 
clatms have been made since 1939 by representatives of the 
dislodged Polish government-in-exile, still operating in London. 5 
In general. deposed governments-in-exile try to prevent a com-
plete break with the past. to maintain the old constitution 
unimpaired, and ensure a sense of institutional continuity. Be-
neath this facade, however. there are often considerable struc -
tural and constitutional changes designed to overcome problems 
ofleadership succession while abroad. In the case of the Spanish 
Republicans. fierce rivalry while in exile between the last prime 
minister of the republic.Ju an Negrin, and the minister of defense 
in Negrin's government. Idalecio Prieto, regarding the legal 
status of the last Republican government, delayed the establish-
ment of a untfied Spanish government-in-exile until 1945, and 
eroded the Republicans' prestige among the Western Powers 
during the initial postwar period .• 
Traditional claims are usually made by deposed exiled 
monarchs, like the Bourbons. the Romanovs, the son of the 
deposed Shah of Iran (who in exile proclaimed himself as Shah 
Riza II). and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Royal Government of 
National Unity founded in China following Sihanouk's overthrow 
and the proclamation of the Khmer republic in 1970. 
Groups which make claims for authentic representation 
are usually led by a charismatic exile leader who promises to 
transform the nation's ltfe. Examples include de Gaulle's chal-
lenge to Vichy in the name of "the soul of France," as he put it in 
his famous broadcasts; Khomeini's anti-Shah exile campaign in 
the name of "Iran and Islam," and since 1981, Masood Rajavi's 
exiled Iranian Mujahedeen, fighting from Iraq (after they were 
forced out of France in 1986) to unseat Iran's Islamic regime on 
behalf of the "real revolutionary Iran." 
Again, all the above-named groups engage in a struggle 
against an indigenous home regime for the right to represent the 
same nation-states. The vocabularies used by the various aspi -
rants to justify their claim to power is usually reflected in their 
organizational makeup, in particular in the internal division 
between the innermost core of the leadership and the groups' 
prime loyalists. 1 
The second category of governments-in-exile includes 
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groups aspiring to statehood. They fight from outside their 
claimed national tenitory to gain independent political status 
inside an international order of sovereign states. These groups 
can be termed pre-state self-determination-oriented or decoloni-
zation-oriented governments-in-exile . Examples include the 
contending parties in the anttcolonial struggle in Angola; the 
Basque government-in-exile seeking independence from Span-
ish rule; the Algerian government-in-exile, founded in Tunis in 
1958 to replace the French colonial rule; the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). whose official title in the United Nations has 
been changed (following the November 1988 Palestine National 
Council's declaration of the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state) from 'PLO' to the 'State of Palestine's; and 
finally. the Polisario Front, founded in 1973 as an alternative to 
Spanish rule in the Western Sahara, and which since 1976 has 
protested on behalf of the self-proclaimed SaharawiArab Demo-
cratic Republic (SADR) against the annexation of the Western 
Sahara by Morocco. The Polisario's limited control over some of 
SADR's claimed tenitories, however, makes its status as a 
government-in-exile questionable.• 
The third category of governments-in-exile is comprised 
of deposed governments that struggle from abroad against a 
foreign invader to regain political independence or tenitory lost 
in a war. The London based Allied governments-in -exile during 
the Second World War represent this sub-group best. They 
included the governments-in-exile of Czechoslovakia, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland. Yugoslavia and Bel-
gium. 
It is possible that governments-in -exile will fall into more 
than one of the above categories at different times during their 
struggles . For example, when the invading countries endeavor to 
abolish the independence of the occupied nations and to incor-
porate their people as part of the conqueror's own national 
community. governments-in-exile of the occupied nation cam-
paign to regain both political independence and self-determina-
tion. Such is the case of the 70 year-old Government of the 
Ukrainian National Republic in exile, which since the Ukrainian 
nation and soil were incorporated into the USSR in 1920, have 
claimed to represent "the last free will of a sovereign Ukrainian 
nation until such a time when a free and independent Ukrainian 
state is restituted on Ukrainian tenitory. M•0 Likewise, the lega-
tions-in-exile of the Baltic states of LaMa, Lithuania and Esto-
nia, continue to challenge the 1940 Soviet annexation of their 
independent countries . The U.S . and British governments (like 
many other western democracies) have never recognized the 
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1939 Molotov-van Ribbentrop pact, and continue to recognize 
and fund the Baltic legations as the legitimate representatives of 
their respective nations . Finally, under this category we can also 
include the Tibetan government-in-exile in India, which, since 
the Dalal Lama's flight from China in 1959. has been the driving 
force behind the ongoing Tibetan struggle to reverse the incorpo-
ration of Tibet into China. 
Other cases of exile contenders which engage in overlap-
ping struggles are de Gaulle's Free French, and the Polish gov-
ernment-in-exile. The Free French contested Vichy's authority in 
metropolitan France while fighting against German occupation. 
The deposed Polish government-in-exile, which fought during 
world the Second War for repossession of its authority from the 
Soviet and German invaders , has, since 1945, been claiming to 
be the sole voice of an "independent and democratic Poland." A 
student of the Polish-government-in-exile has noted that al-
though it seems to have lost its raison d'etre in the postwar 
period, its relentless fifty year campaign on behalf of Polish 
emtgres supporting democratization "is in Itself, a unique phe-
nomenon in the history of political emigrations. "1 1 It will be 
interesting to see whether the London Poles continue to insist on 
maintaining their claims to exclusive legal-democratic status in 
the aftermath of the partially-free democratic elections in Poland 
in June 1989. 
From the above classification we can deduce four distinct 
but related principles of Justification invoked by govemments -
in-exile to support their bids for international recognition. These 
are: 1) the claim of a legal right to govern, which assumes the 
legitimacy is conferred only through democratic elections and is 
not attenuated with the loss of effective control; 2) the illegality 
of occupation, which assumes the sacredness of territorial 
integrity; 3) the right to self-determination; and 4) the right of a 
nation to be represented by its authentic spokesmen. 
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the 
question of whether or not self-proclaimed governments-in -exile 
actually command the allegiance of the people they claim to 
represent is beyond the scope of these classifications; although 
the support of their alleged constituencies may be the most 
critical factor in determining the validity of their claims and the 
attitude of foreign patrons towards their struggles. It is possible. 
however . that an obscure organization with no national roots will 
decide to proclaim itself a government-in-exile (often as a chal-
lenge to other leading contenders) . 
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II. Foreign Support and the Political Nature of Recognition 
The ultimate goal of all governments-in-exile is to gain or 
recapture political power. To that end they make great efforts to 
mobilize their fellow nationals. at home and abroad. and to 
obtain operational and diplomatic assistance from foreign sources 
whose support they consider instrumental to their success. 
Foreign operational support may include money. equipment, 
arms, or even direct inteIVenUon of a patron government to 
install the exiled contender in power. Diplomatic assistance 
varies from declarative and symbolic gestures by minor interna-
tional actors to full recognition by sovereign governments. As 
indicated elsewhere. the degree of diplomatic support accorded 
governments-in-exile does not always reflect commitment by 
international patrons to subsequent operational needs. Limited 
diplomatic acknowledgement may be followed by massive opera-
tional assistance whereas full diplomatic recognition may not 
always be followed by effective rewards. In fact the level of 
diplomatic recognition and the degree of operational support for 
governments-in-exile are always contingent upon the patron 
government's position in international politics, its changing 
political/ideological objectives, and its calculated perception of 
the benefit of using the exiles as pawns in foreign rivalries.' 2 
Although operational aid may be the most critical factor 
in helping governments-in-exile to achieve their ultimate desire 
- governmental power - the issue at the heart of most of their 
international campaigns is legitimacy; that is the international 
acknowledgement of the validity of their claims. Like ruling 
governments and other nonruling contenders, most exiled aspi-
rants seek international approval to convince their national 
constituencies of the validity of their cause. and to discredit other 
rival aspirants as "illegitimate." As Inis Claude points out. 
"emperors (or would-be emperors) may be nude. but they do not 
like to be so. to think themselves so, or to be so regarded. "13 
Governments-in-exile. therefore. ascribe vital importance to 
diplomatic recognition which they consider and present as an 
outward symbol of their revolutionary progress. However. exiled 
contenders may continue to adhere to their claims and persist in 
their political struggle even if their calls for recognition have not 
been heeded. Indeed. most self-proclaimed governments-in-exile 
must rest content with vague and tentative gestures by non-
governmental actors, whose importance they tend to exaggerate 
in making up for the shortcomings of their peculiar "self-
legitimizing" position. 
In world politics governments cannot simultaneously 
accord full diplomatic recognition to more than one aspirant to 
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govern the same tenitortal entity. although two competing 
aspirants may claim sovereignty over the same tenitory or the 
right to represent a population ruled by another state. Hence to 
this day the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile in Dharmsala. 
India. challenges the Chinese claim that Tibet is an integral part 
of China, and maintains that it is the sole legitimate government 
ofTibet and its people." 
Recognition of one contender as the sole representative of 
a state automatically implies nonrecognition of competing claims 
to govern the same state's tenitory. Such is the case regardless 
of whether the recognized contender exercises or lacks effective 
control over the state tenitory. Thus, governments which today 
recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the official 
mouthpiece of the self-proclaimed Palestinian state (whose 
tenitory is now under Israeli control). will automatically reject 
Israel's claim for sovereignty over the same territories, though 
not necessarily the existence of the state of Israel itself. In cases 
of domestic national rivalry over the right to sole representation. 
foreign governments may also decide that none of the competing 
aspirants (in power or in opposition) is qualified to be granted 
recognition as the sole authority to rule without contesting the 
continued existence of the state itself. The patron government 
may therefore withhold recognition from all competing contend-
ers until one of them satisfies its self-prescribed crtterta for 
recognition. Governments which choose the route of withholding 
recognition from all rival claimants also tend to advocate keeping 
the target state's seat in international gatherings vacant. A 
recent case demonstrating such complexity is England's deci-
sion to withhold recognition from all contenders for power in 
Cambodia following the 1979 Vietnamese invasion. The British 
government. which initially voted with the majority of the United 
Nations member-states to prolong recognition of Pol Pot's dis-
lodged government as the legal representative of Kampuchea, 
later changed its position and declared that. "there was no 
Government in Cambodia which it could recognize. "u Britain 
thus derecogntzed Pol Pot. and at the same time denied recogni-
tion to the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrtn. 
By and large, governments-in-exile are more likely to 
obtain full diplomatic recognition when their prospective inter-
national patrons are predisposed to deny recognition to the 
existing home regime. At least four broad and distinct (but 
related) rationales may be invoked by ruling governments to 
justify nonrecognition of toward other sovereign govemments: 1• 
1) They have come to power in an illegal manner, whether 
by extra-constitutional means in an already established state 
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(coup d'etat, civil war, etc.), or by unilaterally declaring them-
selves rulers of states whose territory and people are already ac-
knowledged to be part of another nation-state. An example of the 
former instance is the early withholding of recognition from the 
newly established Bolshevik regime by the governments of 
France, Italy, and the United States. In the early 1920s the three 
governments continued to treat "diplomats or consuls sent by 
the tsarist or provisional governments of Russia as representa-
tives of the Russian state. "11 The most notable example of the 
latter case is the Western allies' postwar refusal to recognize the 
government of East Germany which was declared a "non-entity" 
on the ground that it governed a territory and bore a name for 
which it had no legitimate claim. 18 
2) They are perceived as "puppets or stooges, merely part 
of other states' governmental structure. "1• The refusal of the 
majority of U.N. member-states to recognize the Vietnamese 
sponsored-government in Cambodia ts again a good illustration 
of such a case. In general, the presence of an occupying force 
increases the likelihood that a native home regime - especially if 
it was installed by the occupier - will earn the reputation of a 
puppet. Such instances, however, do not automatically entail 
prolonged recognition of the deposed government at the expense 
of the home regime. As always, recognition practices are deter-
mined by the changing political goals of the recognizing govern-
ment. This is best exemplified in the changing policies of India 
toward the rival contenders for power in Cambodia that accom-
panied the 1980 transition from the Janata administration to 
Gandhi's government. Janata's non-aligned foreign policy was 
manifested in India's decision to deny recognition to both Pol Pot 
and the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrin. India 
thus objected to the seating of either delegation in the U.N. The 
coming to power of Indira Gandhi, in January 1980, produced a 
shift in India's policy. Although she was rhetorically committed 
to the policy of non-alignment, Gandhi leaned toward the Soviet 
Union (which she considered a more reliable friend of India than 
the U.S.); on July 7, 1980, she announced India's recognition of 
the Vietnamese-sponsored regime, an act which stirred broad 
international condemnation oflndia by the United States, China 
and most of all the members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). but which was welcomed by the Sovi-
ets.•• 
Even more illuminating is the fact that despite the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, its client-governments of Babrak Kar-
mal. and Najibulha, respectively, continued to occupy the Af-
ghan U.N. seat. Kabul's uncontested status in the U.N. which 
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could be attributed. in the early period of the Soviet presence. to 
the absence of a viable opposition contender, surprisingly re-
mained unchallenged even after the consolidation of the Muj ahe-
deen U.S.-Pakistani sponsored seven-party exile alliance in 
Peshawar." 
3) They are labeled as representatives of states which are 
founded on alleged "original sin" especially in their domestic 
political composition. A classic example of this category is the 
almost unanimous refusal of U.N. state-members to recognize 
south Africa's apartheid government and its offspring independ-
ent homelands of Bophuthatswana. Transkei. Venda, and 
Ciskei. 22 
4) The home government's annexation of other independ-
ent states is deemed unacceptable and 'unlawful'. The occupied 
forces are denied recognition as governments of the occupied 
territories on the ground that "military occupation by itself does 
not confer title or extinguish a nation. Nor does a proclamation 
of annexation so long as the claims of the occupying Power are 
effectively challenged and remained unrecognized. "23 The refusal 
of Great Britain and the U.S. to recognize the Soviet annexation 
of the Baltic states is a case in point. The two countries still 
continue to provide the aging representatives of the Baltic states 
with diplomatic courtesies. 
The denial of recognition of ruling governments on the 
basis of these principles opens the door for non-ruling contend-
ers, including self-proclaimed governments-in-exile. who ask for 
recognition of their claims to be the sole and most genuine 
alternative to the home regime. The mere existence of such exiled 
contenders - even if they are operationally incapable ofreplacing 
the home regime - may become. in and of itself, an important 
factor in affecting the recognition posture of governments vis-a-
vis the home regime: they may extend recognition to the exiled 
contender as part of their strategy to undermine the home 
regime. Non-ruling contenders who claim to represent sovereign 
states may be recognized only as de Jure (and not as de Jactol 
authorities, a distinction which implies that. from the standpoint 
of patron governments rulership does not sanctify a "legitimate" 
right. 
International Law and the Changing International Mythologies 
International law has developed a body of principles and 
criteria for granting. withdrawing, or withholding recognition 
among governments which are also applicable to relations be-
tween sovereign governments and self-proclaimed governments-
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in-exile. There are three major approaches in this literature. The 
"traditional approach" conditions recognition on the ability of the 
recognized government to exercise effective control over its 
tenitory by possessing the state's machinery; its propensity to 
fulfill international obligations; and the degree of support it 
receives from its claimed constituencies (without specifying a 
particular form of goverrrment). The "Estrada doctrine," named 
for the Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada, advocates the 
elimination ofrecognition from diplomatic practice. It maintains 
that only new states, not governments, should be recognized, 
and condemns the practice of granting, withdrawing, or with-
holding recognition for constituting foreign intervention in other 
states' domestic affairs. Finally. the 'Tobar /Betancourt ap-
proach," links recognition to democratic practices. It promotes 
nonrecognition of goverrrments that come to power through extra 
constitutional means until "a free election is held and new 
leaders elected." The concept is also known as "automatic 
nonrecognition."•• 
The various theories of recognition are mutually incom-
patible. Their notorious ambiguity and arbitrariness have earned 
the law of recognition the reputation of being "the most maligned 
and controversial branch of international law."25 This situation 
reflects the inability or unwillingness of governments to establish 
clear and stable priorities among a number of principles of 
"legitimation" to all of which lip service is paid by the interna-
tional community. These principles, which gain preeminence at 
different political conjunctions. promote. at least rhetorically, 
themes such as self-determination, democracy and popular 
consent. human rights. and nonintervention (or territorial integ-
rity). The result, or perhaps the reason for the absence of unified 
criteria for affording recognition in international law theory is 
that all governments are free to adopt and interpret the doctrines 
of recognition in accordance with their policy objectives and 
ideologies. In practice, therefore, diplomatic recognition is no 
more than a political mechanism exploited by governments to 
advance or undermine conflicting claims to power in other states. 
in an attempt to enhance their own interests (domestic or 
foreign). 28 The exploitation of recognition ofrecognition in world 
politics is particularly pronounced in the case of govemments-
in-exiles, which are accorded or denied recognition as the foreign 
policy agendas of established governments dictate. 
In the 19th century recognition was usually extended to 
new governments once they satisfied the seemingly objective 
criteria for effective control. In this century, especially since 
1917, recognition is no longer automatically conferred on effec-
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uve governments; it became imbued with ideological considera-
uons.• 1 In the early years of the 20th century. when legal-
democratic principles became enshrined. governments in in-
creasing numbers had begun linking their recognition policies to 
the political character of the target regime. The first institution-
alization of democratic-legality as a principal guideline for recog-
nition policies was the 1907 signing of the Central American 
Treaty of Peace and Amity . The republics of Guatemala. Costa 
Rica, El Salvador. Nicaragua and Honduras agreed. as a self-
protective measure. to deny recognition of "any other Govern-
ment which may come into power in any of the five Republics as 
a consequence of a coup d'etat ... or of a revolution against the 
recognized Government. so long as the freely elected representa-
tives of the people thereof, have not constitutionally reorganized 
the country. " •e 
The legal -democratic criteria dominated recognition 
policies of many governments throughout the first half of this 
century . Between the 1920s and the 1940s recognized govern-
ments-in-exile were for the most part governments deposed by a 
native or a foreign regime . They were recognized as the legal and 
dejure_sovereign power of their country. and were treated "as if 
they were still ruling the state even though their government has 
Jost effective control. "29 Prolonged recognition of deposed exiled 
governments became a common practice especially during the 
Second World War. In London and Washington. D.C .. exiled 
governments and officials of countries occupied by Germany 
.vere recognized as "the legal successor to the government which 
(they) replaced. "3 0 a status which entitled them to full diplomatic 
immunity and privileges. The governments-in-exile were empow-
ered by the Allied Powers. through the Maritime Courts Act of 
1941. to have jurisdiction over their fellow nationals residing in 
the recognizing countries. This included the authority to main-
tain their own armies. to control their countries· assets abroad. 
and the right to try their own national for certain specified 
offenses (although they were forbidden "'to retain or imprison ... 
any person .. . or a national' of that country . ... and had to rely on 
British authorities and courts for enforcement of their statutes 
and decrees . "31 
Withholding recognition from an occupier or its native 
surrogate. while at the same time prolonging recognition of a 
deposed government. carried the message that effective control 
over the territory did not confer "legitimacy." But the message 
was not just symbolic. By treating the deposed governments as 
if they were still ruling their countries, the recognizing govern-
ments sought to keep their exiled institutions - and especially 
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their defeated armies - intact as a living challenge to the home 
regime, and to prepare them as designated rulers in the postwar 
period . The Allied powers, using the legal-democratic principle to 
justify their recognition of the deposed governments, were hesi-
tant to grant similar recognition to Charles de Gaulle's Free 
French which had no legal status prior to its creation. As 
Krystyna Marek has noted, de Gaulle's claim to be the authentic 
representative of all Frenchmen was insufficient to justify the 
granting of full recognition, since "'peoples are not a subject of 
international law and can therefore hardly be legally repre-
sented . "3 2 In fact, the United States, the Soviet Union, and even 
Britain recognized Petain's government. and continued to host 
Vichy's diplomatic officials until 1943 .33 The Free French's 
official status, reduced to that of a "national committee". did not, 
however. prevent the allies from bestowing on de Gaulle the same 
diplomatic privileges enjoyed by other recognized govemments-
in-exile, or, for that matter, from granting his liberation commit-
tee massive operational assistance. 
Recognition, is not. as M.J. Peterson has noted, "irrevo-
cable once given ... ,. As McDougal and Reisman have pointed out. 
governments may elicit changing attitudes among other govern-
ments "akin to recognition and derecognition.""" The tentative 
nature of recognition was manifested at the end of the Second 
World War when the Polish government-in-exile was abandoned 
by its Western allies. In 1943, when the great Soviet counter-
offensive was already underway, Stalin broke off relations with 
the Polish government -in-exile. The British government, fearful 
of destroying the coalition with the Soviets, failed to stand by its 
Polish allies. and when the Red Army reached Poland Stalin was 
quick to execute his plan to install a government to his liking. 
Stalin thus created a "Polish National Council" consisting of 
Polish communists and nonentities and shortly before Yalta he 
recognized the group as the Provisional National Government of 
Poland. At Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt yielded on the Polish 
question . They deserted the London Poles and eventually recog-
nized the Lublin group as the future government of Poland. 36 
In the postwar period legal-democratic principles domi-
nated international political rhetoric. Today, a nondemocratic 
regime, "feels compelled to shed its more authoritarian and 
totalitarian traits in order to establish a popular image of 
legitimate rule. "37 Furthermore, following the war the principle of 
territorial integrity suffered an erosion in favor of "cosmopolitan" 
morality. 38 By 1946 the United Nations- allegedly representing 
a democratic world order - had already emerged as the prime 
arbiter among legitimation principles used in granting global 
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approval and disapproval of conflicting claims to rule particular 
states. The world community, in its charters and law (such as the 
Declaration of Human Rights, and the genocide Treaty of 1948) 
has acknowledged individuals. not only governments. as legal 
entities in the eyes of international law, which means that the 
domestic legal order of every state has become a matter of 
concern for all mankind. Since the war. then. sovereignty is no 
longer hailed as being morally sup~rior in its own right. and the 
u.N. may even advocate military action to put an end to a state's 
actions that it deems intolerable. 3 • 
The first and perhaps most dramatic postwar attempt by 
the international community to unseat an indigenous home 
government in the name of the legal-democratic principle was the 
General Assembly's labeling of Franco's fascist regime as a 
potential threat to world peace . On December 12, 1946, the U.N. 
adopted a resolution which barred Spain from membership in 
the international agencies of the United Nations until democracy 
was restored. The resolution also recommended a universal 
withdrawal recognition from Franco's government. and author-
ized the Security Council to determine "within a reasonable time 
.. . the adequate measures to be taken to remedy the situation." 
This unusual resolution, however, was of limited effect without 
the wholehearted support of the Western powers. By 1946 the 
Great Powers were already immersed in the Cold War and the 
British and U.S. governments preferred Franco's staunch anti-
communism to the prospect of the return to power of the left-
leaning Republican government-in-exile. The Western allies fell 
short of breaking relations with Franco, and even France, which 
ordered the closing of its border with Spain and made symbolic 
gestures toward the Giral Republican government in Paris, 
refrained from extending diplomatic recognition to the Spanish 
government -in-exile. By 1947 only a handful of European and 
Latin American governments granted diplomatic recognition to 
the Spanish govemment-in-exile• 0 while the U.S. and Britain 
saved face by maintaining that despite the international 
community 's obligation to democracy in Spain it was the Span-
iards alone who could bring about a change of regime. As Louis 
Stein, a student of the exiled Republicans, has pointed out, 
despite the rhetoric of democracy "the idea of nonintervention 
had been of service to Franco . . .. The demands of the Cold War 
had made his anticommunism respectable. He had become the 
pillar of strength and virtue in the campaign against the Soviet 
Bloc (while) the Spanish Republicans had surely been betrayed 
by their friend."., By 1950 the U.S., Britain and France had 
already initiated an international campaign to remove the 1946 
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resolution, and called for the admission of Nationalist Spain to 
the United Nations . Spain finally became a full member of the 
U.N. in 1955, whiletheSpanishRepublicangovernment -in-exile 
rapidly lost the limited recognition it had previously enjoyed and 
"ceased to have meaning to anybody outside of the exile itself. "•2 
The international conventions which promoted the use of 
outside inteivention to terminate human rights violations were 
further developed in the U.N. anticolonial provisions. With the 
growing wave of national liberation in Third World countries, the 
idea of self -determination- itself an extension of the democratic 
concept- became preeminent in the international community's 
archetypes oflegitimacy. The growmg number of former colonies 
gaining independence and membership in the U.N. moved the 
organization to adopt the Decolonization Declaration (Dec. 14, 
1960). which branded colonial rule inimical "to human rights 
and (the) pursuit of peace ." 43 It also declared "that all peoples 
have the right to self-determination ..... Res 2621 XXV of October 
12, 1970 extended this provision to "reaffirm the inherent right 
of colonial peoples to struggle by all necessary means at their 
disposal against Colonial Powers which suppress their aspira-
tion for freedom and independence ."•• 
Since the early 1950s. therefore, most recognized govern-
ments-in-exile were no longer dispossessed governments trying 
to prolong a de Jure international status, but rather aspiring 
exiled contenders seeking to transform their self-proclaimed de 
Jure status into de facto control of a given target territory. The 
revolutionary Algerian government-in-exile (the Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne or GPRA). established in 
1958 in Tunis, was among the first to invoke anticolonialism to 
challenge French sovereignty over Algeria. The GPRA claimed to 
represent the Algerian people and it was consequently recog-
nized by the Arab States, China, and the countries of the Soviet 
bloc as the "legitimate" representative of Algeria . The Soviets 
refrained from granting recognition, fearing a possible severance 
of relations with de Gaulle's government.•• 
With the formation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in 1963, many self-proclaimed liberation movements 
sought and gained recognition by African governments whose 
countries had already gained independence . The OAU's special 
Liberation Committee provided a forum for the new aspirants, 
and its declared intention was to promote the most "legitimate" 
contenders from the newly self-proclaimed nation-states . The 
OAU's official criteria for recognition required the exiled contend-
ers to demonstrate their effective struggle against the colonial 
powers and to manifest their ability to muster popular support 
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among their claimed constituencies at home. Although the 
OAU's recognition policies were declared to be free of ideological 
or political considerations, political motives and blocs dominated 
some of the most crucial decisions of the organization. 47 
The Angolan case is perhaps the most instructive ex-
ample of the OAU's changing position in determining the most 
"legitimate" contender to replace Portuguese colonial rule. In 
Angola, Holden Roberto's self-proclaimed revolutionary exiled 
government, the Govemo Revolucionario de Angola no Exile 
(GRAE) vied for OAU's recognition with Dr. Agostinho Neto's 
Movirnento Popular de Liberacao de Angola (MPLA). The GRAE 
claimed to be "the only movement to represent the Angolan 
people." while Neto maintained that the MPIA had acquired the 
rtght to recognition as "the only one that was fighting the 
Portuguese troops."•• Throughout the 1960s the OAU futilely 
sought to create unity between the two contenders. It first 
accorded recognition only to the GRAE, but the growing discon-
tent among many OAU delegates with the GRAE's poor perform-
ance in the fight against the Portuguese, led to a reversal of this 
position . In 1969, the OAU Liberation Committee voted for the 
withdrawal of recognition of the GRAE, and after 1971 Holden 
Roberto's organization was referred to as a government-in-exile 
only by Zaire. Other OAU member-states recognized the MPIA. •• 
During the 1960s and again during the 1970s the OAU 
Liberation Committee often faced requests for recognition and 
operational aid from two or more political contenders aspiring to 
represent the same nation, and the organization soon became 
the supreme body in determining the "most legitimate" among 
them. However, since many of the OAU member-states - as well 
as the aspiring groups themselves - were recipients of either 
Chinese or Soviet aid, recognition quickly became intertwined 
with Sino-Soviet competition, and the OAU faced increasing 
internal divisions. In a few cases the OAU in an attempt to avoid 
alienating any of its patron powers, simultaneously recognized 
two rival claimants. In the case of Namibia and South Africa, the 
OAU recognized, respectively, both the Soviet-backed SWAPO 
and the African National Congress (ANC) as well as the Chinese 
sponsored South West Africa National Union (SWANU) and the 
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).•• 
The OAU's susceptibility to power politics in determining 
recognition policies was further manifested in the case of West-
ern Sahara, which was annexed by Morocco and Mauritania after 
the termination of Spanish colonial rule. In 1976, the OAU 
announced its intention to admit to membership the Polisario 
Front as spokesmen of the self-proclaimed Saharawi Arab 
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Democratic Republic (SADR). However, threats to withdraw from 
the organization by King Hassan of Morocco and the President of 
Mauritania, Mouktar Ould Dada. delayed any formal decision.• 1 
It took eight years, during which the OAU experienced internal 
divisions and intense disruption over the subject of Western 
Sahara, until the majority of its member-states officially recog-
nized the SADR In 1984 Polisario's representatives were invited 
to take the SADR seat in the organization. Morocco immediately 
withdrew its membership while Mauritania succumbed to the 
pressure and recognized the new state-in-exile.•• 
The technique of recognizing a government-in-exile in an 
attempt to undermine the ruling regime is not limited to cases of 
self-determination or decolonization. It has also been exploited 
by governments seeking to undermine regimes backed by occu-
pying countries, and, in fewer instances, to discredit native 
governments of independent states. Patron governments may 
therefore encourage exile groups to unite their forces (or at least 
to project a stronger image of unite) in order to make themselves 
worthy of eventual recognition as the most viable alternative to 
the home regime. During the Second World War, for example. the 
British Foreign Office was provoked by two notable anti-Fascist 
exile leaders. Luigi Sturzo and Carlo Sforza, to form and recog-
nize an Italian government-in-exile - similar to the Free French 
- to counter Mussolini. The search for an exile leader who could 
unite the Italian forces, just as de Gaulle organized the French 
resistance, was soon suspended when British officials in Europe 
and the U.S. concluded that there was no such Italian figure 
capable of establishing a respectable government-in-exile.• 3 
Likewise, President Eisenhower, in the hope of overpowering 
Castro in an exile-led operation, urged Cuban exile groups in 
Miami to unite their forces and select a leader whom he could 
recognize as Mthe head of a government-in-exile."-. Finally, the 
Sudanese government attempted in 1965 to undermine the 
neighboring government of Chad by proclaiming its intention to 
recognize the government-in-exile formed by Chadian refugees 
on its territory. However. discussions encouraged by the OAU led 
to settlement of the Sudan's differences with Chad and to a 
Sudanese promise to expel the refugees and stop aiding their 
organization.•• 
The most recent development which demonstrating the 
complexity of the use of recognition to undermine regimes 
installed by a foreign invader is the refusal of a majority of U.N. 
members to recognize the Vietnamese sponsored government of 
Cambodia. preferring instead to continue to recognize the exiled 
coalition government of Pol Pot. In 1979, when the Khmer Rouge 
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were defeated by the Vietnamese invasion. most of its cadres fled 
to Thailand. The Chinese government. facing the crushing of an 
ally by Soviet-backed Vietnam, and Thailand, fearing the pres-
ence of Vietnamese troops on its border, refused to accept 
Hanoi's victory. With the help of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations and other U.N. member-states, they extended 
recognition to the Khmer Rouge as Cambodia's legitimate gov-
ernment. The Thai and Chinese governments, also provided the 
Pol Pot forces with operational bases and military aid to resist the 
Vietnamese-backed government of Hun Sen. In the early 1980s 
the U.S. also considered Pol Pot a convenient instrument in the 
fight against Vietnam providing his forces with financial support 
and doing little to counter the Khmer Rouge's official status. Now, 
on the eve of the Vietnamese withdrawal (expected by Sept. 1989) 
many governments are alarmed by the prospects of Pol Pot 
returning to power, and are making efforts to encourage a new 
coalition (which will exclude the Khmer Rouge) between the Hun 
sen government and Prince Norodon Sihanouk. the most promi-
nent exile contender in Cambodia's recent history.•• 
The use of diplomatic recognition of exile aspirants as a 
weapon in undermining hostile indigenous governments of inde-
pendent states was less frequent in the last decade . But this has 
not prevented governments that maintain full diplomatic rela-
tions with native home regimes from openly trying to undermine 
them by sponsoring their exiled opposition . For instance, through-
out its war with Iran, the Iraqi government maintained full 
diplomatic relations with Teheran. while at the same time 
abetting the struggle of Khomeini's arch rivals. Masood Rajavi's 
Iranian exile Mujhaedeen and sheltering its members. In July 
1988, just a week before Khomeini's surprising acceptance of 
U.N. Resolution 598, calling for the ending of the war with Iraq. 
Rajavi made public his intention to set up, with the permission 
of the Iraqi president. Saddam Hussein. a government-in-exile 
"to administer 'liberated areas· of Iran en route to the takeover in 
Teheran. ~ The cease fire on August 20, dealt a devastating blow 
to Rajavi's hopes, for the Iraqis were quick to compromise their 
erstwhile ally."' A similar case which demonstrates governments' 
resent reluctance to exploit diplomatic recognition of their exiled 
clients (as a political weapon in undermining rival regimes). is the 
United State's continued diplomatic relations with the Sandin-
ista government in Nicaragua while simultaneously openly aid-
ing the exiled Contras in their struggle to overthrow the regime 
in Managua. The newly apparent tendency to maintain diplo-
matic relations with enemy regimes may reflect a growing 
acknowledgement among governments that a nonrecognition 
21 
posture toward hostile governments or recognition of exiled con-
tenders at their expense has proven to be ineffective or even 
counterproductive technique. A critic of the U.S. nonrecognition 
policy in Latin America, Africa and East Asia has observed that 
the real victim of the practice Uhas been the global diplomacy of 
the United States. When regular channels of official contact are 
choked off, protection of United States interests and achieve-
ment of United States objectives becomes much more difficult. "•a 
Other examples of this strategy abound. Hence despite 
vast U.S. and Pakistani operational support of Afghan exile 
rebels in their struggle to overthrow the Soviet-backed govern-
ment in Kabul, the two governments stopped short of breaking 
off official relations with the regime . Even after the proclamation 
of the Afghan coalition government-in-exile on February 23, 
1989, (whose formation had long been encouraged by the U.S. 
and Pakistan) the self-proclaimed government-in-exile's call for 
international recognition and the right to fill the nation's seat in 
the United Nations remained unheeded. The State Department 
announced that the U.S. would withhold recognition until the 
government-in-exile obtained ucontrol over territory, a function-
ing civil administration. broad popular support, and (the) ability 
to honor international obligations."•• In a sim1lar fashion, Paki-
stani Premier Benazir Bhutto excused her country's nonrecogni-
tion policy by proclaiming its commitment to the principle of 
nonintervention: "We have not recognized it because we would 
like respect paid to the Geneva accords. "80 Recent events in 
Panama. however. indicate that the U.S. government has not 
entirely dispensed with the use of recognition as a political tool 
in undermining opponent regimes . Thus in March 1988, the 
ousted exiled President of Panama. Eric Arturo Delvalle. was 
recognized by U.S. officials as the lawful president of Panama. In 
December 1988. Delvalle was received in the White House by 
President Reagan and by the President-elect Bush as part of the 
U.S. campaign to remove Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega from 
power.•• In May 1989, after Noriega violently stole the elections 
in Panama. the U.S. protested the fraudulent nullification of the 
vote taking the unusual step of granting official recognition to the 
opposition leader Guillermo Endara as Panama's president-
elect.•2 
III. The Elusive Nature of International Legitimation 
We have thus seen that in world politics there is a large 
pool of broadly interpreted principles interchangeably invoked 
by governments to justify their recognition policies vis-a-vis rival 
contenders to power in other states. The ideas of territorial 
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1ntegrity (or nonintervention). self-determination, human rights, 
legality and democracy can cancel each other out in instructing 
recognition policies. A government installed by foreign invaders 
may be labeled a puppet and may be denied recognition even 
though it has consequently consolidated power independently, 
while a deposed exiled contender may enjoy prolonged recogni-
tion despite its criminal human rights record and lack of popular 
support at home. Governments that grant diplomatic recognition 
and provide operational assistance to exiled contenders may 
maintain that the principle of nonintervention ls inapplicable to 
what they consider colonial possessions, unconstitutional ways 
of acquiring power. or nondemocratic practices. Patron govern-
ments may even bestow recognition on a surrogate exile group 
which they themselves created and which they then declare to be 
authentic representatives of an alleged national constituency. 
Since recognition practices are subsumed under tactical 
considerations dictated by the patron's immediate interest, they 
do not always match (at least in appearance) the overall position 
of a government toward the contestants in other states' power 
struggles. On the one hand, recognition does not entail any 
additional commitment by the patron government. Thus a gov-
ernment which officially rejects the legitimacy of ruling authori-
ties and affords de Jure recognition to its exiled opponents may 
at the same time have a strong connection with the unrecognized 
authorities in the form of litigation, trade and exchange of 
travelers. As Leon Lipson. a scholar of international law. has 
pointed out. the advantage of recognition d.efactoover recognition 
de Jure lies in affording the opportunity for "gradation of treat-
ment. "•3 On the other hand. governments that provide massive 
military aid to assist exiled claimants to power may at the same 
time withhold diplomatic recognition from their clients. They 
may maintain full diplomatic relations with a rival home govern-
ment in order to maintain close ties with domestic developments 
and to have easier access to intelligence channels which require 
stable diplomatic relations. Pakistan's policy towards the Afghan 
rebels self-proclaimed government-in-exile is an extreme illus-
tration of political hypocrisy in which a sponsoring government 
exploited the idea of nonintervention to justify nonrecognition of 
its exiled clients . Pakistan has justified its military assistance to 
the Afghan exiles as a humanitarian relief effort, while referring 
to its exiled clients as "refugee organizations." 
The attempt to translate the tentative nature of recogni-
tion in the political realm into the language of international law 
by invoking the distinction between de Jure and de facto is 
unpopular among many international law students. One of them 
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has warned that those who are resorting to the usage of dejure/ 
de facto to describe international relations are "committing 
atrocities of analysis ."•• Scholars and practitioners who have 
sought to free recognition from political and ideological consid-
erations have long advocated the limitation of recognition only to 
states, based on the supposedly objective criterion of effective 
control. However, as Peterson, another international law stu-
dent. has pointed out recognition of governments is here to stay, 
since "states are abstract entities capable of acting only through 
some human agent. and the government is that agent. "Thus. she 
concluded, relations between states can never be free from 
"emotional reaction or political calculation . "•5 Indeed, even rec-
ognition of a non -existing aspiring state. such as the newly self-
proclaimed state of Palestine, implies recognition of the right of 
those who declare the state to exist - in this case the PLO - to also 
speak on Its behalf, and thus, by extension. recognition of a 
government.•• 
The unstable nature of recognition is especially clear in 
the case of self -proclaimed governments -in-exile whose exis-
tence is by nature tenuous. Since they are usually treated by 
sovereign governments not as players but as playing cards, we 
must ask ourselves how recognition may advance the exiles' final 
goal. In general. the conflict over who has the right to govern a 
state is determined by the state's constituencies at home (and to 
a lesser degree in the diaspora community). as well as by foreign 
actors who strive to seat or unseat other states· governments in 
order to enhance their own political interests. They all throw their 
support behind a particular contestant whom they tend to 
declare the most "legitimate" aspirant. Whethergovernments-in-
exile are fictional entities or serious contenders is a function of 
their ability to obtain the loyalty of their state's constituencies at 
the expense of other contenders for power (especially the home 
regime). and to mobilize foreign support for their ultimate goal. 
The success or failure of exiled contenders in mobilizing national 
support may affect their campaign in the international sphere 
and vice versa . On the one hand, foreign support ls likely to 
decline over time as governments come to realize that the home 
regime ls stable and not apt to be seriously affected by domestic 
reslstance.• 1 On the other hand. foreign support is likely to rise 
with the renewed popularity of the exiled contender at home. We 
must remember, however, that diplomatic recognition is only one 
among many factors. neither sufficient nor necessary, to deter-
mine the final outcome of the exiles· struggle . 
Until the end of the Second World War. as long as there 
was no "authoritative" body to acknowledge and interpret ques-
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uons of regimes· legitimacy. recognition practices reflected the 
patron government's self-prescribed ideological and political 
criteria. The consistent refusal of Mexico to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of Franco's regime, and Mexico's prolonged recogni-
tion of the Spanish Republican government-in-exile (in the face 
of domestic pressure to accept the Nationalist government in 
Madrid. and despite the changing international climate in favor 
of Franco).•• may be regarded as one of the most genuine 
expressions of support for legal-democratic principles in this 
century. ••The recognition of the deposed Russian governments 
in the early 1920s. however. had more to do with the European 
governments' ideological and political dislike to the Soviet au-
thorities than with genuine endorsement of the legality of the 
deposed bodies. 10 
The postwar formation of the United Nations was in-
tended to provide a global remedy for the subjugation of prin-
ciples of legitimacy to political considerations. The U.N.'s as-
cribed role as "custodian of collective legitlmacy" 11 aimed at 
providing universal approval followed by international assis-
tance to ]ust" causes and global repudiation and resistance of 
"evil." However. the evidence of the last decades indicates that 
rather than upholding genuine philosophical criteria of interna-
tional justice. the U.N. practice of recognition reflects the crude 
interests of its more powerful member-states. The U .N .. it may be 
argued. institutionalized the practice of cloaking strategic inter-
ests with the banner of international morality. Because the U.N. 
was intended to be the representative of a world democratic 
order. it was endowed with the power to facilitate the claims to 
power of non-ruling aspirants whose cause it deems legitimate. 
and who therefore become authorized recipients of international 
aid as authentic representatives of their populations. Thus. 
recognized exile claimants. like SWAPO. ANC, PAC and the PLO, 
ertjoy most of the diplomatic privileges accorded to sovereign 
governments and have access to the treasuries and armories of 
the U.N. donor countries. Unrecognized home regimes. on the 
other hand. are usually excluded from the work of international 
organizations. denied their benefits. and are often forced to 
conduct their international relations - diplomatic, economic, 
and cultural - "at a clandestine. non-governmental level."12 In 
the case of Cambodia. the continuous recognition of the deposed 
DK exiled coalition government at the expense of the Hanoi-
installed government of the Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) - has 
prevented the latter from drawing upon U.N. programs to 
strengthen its domestic political position. 13 
Recognition of exiled claimants in the U. N. has been 
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particularly important in cases where governments-in-exile 
granted the authority to monitor and direct the relief effort of a 
large diaspora community in refugee camps. In these cases the 
money allocated by the U.N. agencies for medical care, food. and 
shelter has often been exploited politically be exile contenders 
who run these caps. Hence. the fact that Pol Pot's exiled Coalition 
government of Democratic Kampuchea has its flag in the U.N. 
has authorized the Khmer Rouge to have total control over 
refugee camps in Thailand. Moreover. since the Thai government 
did not apply its own laws within the camps, their inhabitants 
have become totally dependent on the Khmer Rouge forces, and 
are retained through disinformation, propaganda sessions. fear 
and retribution. 74 
Recognition of an aspirant exile group may also have a 
critical effect in determining the balance of power within broad 
exile coalition. Due to their peculiar position. exiled governments 
are often beset with factionalism. Recognition and its side 
benefits may be a prime incentive on the part of the coalition 
members to preserve unity. The failure of the Giral government-
in-exile to mobilize international recognition eroded the already 
fragile Spanish Republican unity and provoked some exiled 
Republican leaders to abandon the legal camp in an attempt to 
form a more viable coalition against Franco. 75 Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, who had been criticized for allying himself with the 
Khmer Rouge in the exiled Cambodian coalition government. 
defended his decision as the only possible way to acquire 
international recognition: 
"We would like to be separated from the Khmer 
Rouge. We would like to form a nationalist gov-
ernment without the Khmer Rouge. But how can 
we form a nationalist government outside the 
legal framework of Democratic Kampuchea be-
cause Democratic Kampuchea is the legal entity; 
it is still the full member of the U.N. If we don't 
accept the legality of Democratic Kampuchea, we 
cannot be recognized by the U.N. and ifwe are not 
recognized by the U.N.. we might just protest 
against the Vietnamese in the streets. in front of 
the U.N. No. ifwe want to be helpful to Cambodia, 
we must have at our disposal the U.N. platform. 
We can speak out against the Vietnamese. and get 
legal and official support from the U.N."1 • 
Finally. a critic of the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the Afghan 
self-proclaimed government in exile has argued that "Withhold-
ing recognition inadvertently destabilizes the Mujahedeen coa-
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lition. It encourages clashes between traditional rivals. fosters 
manipulative competition by factions, . . . and discourages 
defections from the Soviet puppet government in Kabul. "11 
One may argue that when patron governments fail to 
provide operational support above declarative aclmowledge-
ment. exiled contenders may fall victim to political rhetoric and 
may Macguire an illusion of importance which becomes self-
fulfilling . "1 • In the early 1970s a leading student of African 
politics who examined the position of SWAPO of Namibia 
remarked that, the U.N. recognition of the exile struggle created 
Mfalse hopes and inhibited nationalist initiative, only finally to 
leave exile Namibians further from power and thus more 
frustrated and dependent than they had been before the United 
Nations assumed responsibility for their cause. "1 • However, one 
must also remember that in world politics institutions are what 
they are largely because of what certain people think, feel and 
say about them . Hence, the recent pact concerning Namibia's 
independence and the expected withdrawal of South African 
forces may demonstrate - if and when the agreements are 
carried out- that the continuous presence of SWAPO in the U.N. 
has been the most valuable asset in SWAPO's ability to capture 
power inside Namibia.• 0 
As some of the examples given above demonstrate there 
is no integral connection between the U.N. decision to confer 
recognition upon an aspirant. and the moral validity of the 
aspirant claim. As Inis Claude profoundly remarked, the critical 
question Mis not what principle is acknowledged but who is 
accepted as the authoritative interpreter of the principle, or to 
put it in institutional term how the process of legitimation 
works ."•1 Although U.N. decisions and declarations are pre-
sented in the name of the Mworld community." they represent no 
more than the will of interlocking blocs which provide the 
majority vote needed to control the interpretation and bounda-
ries of fundamental principles oflegitimacy. AsJeaneJ. Kirkpa-
trick has pointed out, in the U. N. Ma continuing political struggle 
is waged to control the definition of key terms (and the) 
description of reality. What are human rights? Who is abused? 
What is aggression? Who is the aggressor and who is the victim? 
What is a national liberation movement -who is liberated, who 
is subjugated?When is a force legitimate, when is it illegitimate? 
All are 'decided ' by majority vote. "u 
Thus despite the fact that the U.N. Charter prohibits the 
acquisition of territory and the annexation of people by means 
of force, a majority of governments has avoided challenging the 
annexation ofTibet by China, and have denied recognition to the 
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Dalal Lama's Tibetan government-in-exile even though it has 
enjoyed the overwhelming support of Tibetans in the diaspora 
and under Chinese occupation. At the same time, Pol Pot's 
criminal DK exiled government has been granted recognition as 
the authentic representative of the people of Cambodia, on 
whom it has been perpetrating genocide. 
In conclusion, although the U.N. set out to replace power 
and ideological politics with universal moral principles, in its 
practice of recognition it has often succeeded only in obscuring 
the concept of legitimacy. If there is any hope of establishing a 
genuine and reliable set of principles of international justice, we 
must begin by separating the language of recognition from that 
of legitimacy. 
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